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Nontechnical Summary 
 
Bargaining situations and negotiations frequently look like a strife for fairness. While 
bargainers are arguing to get their “fair share” when they feel disadvantaged, the meaning of 
“fair” is often heavily debated. Negotiations therefore become more complicated when there 
is more than one justifiable fairness norm (Raiffa 1982, p.268). Here, negotiators could 
potentially pick those fairness principles which justify additional demands from their side. 
Besides being prevalent in daily life, equity criteria are also ubiquitously used in the 
international arena when it comes to negotiating multilateral agreements. In the international 
negotiations on the mitigation of climate change, different notions of equity have been 
proposed. The UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) recognizes the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. Notions 
like “equal per capita emissions”, “polluter-pays”, or “sovereignty” all show different 
interpretations of fairness. When different conflicting fairness principles exist, the 
negotiations process involves a weighing and reconciliation of the different proposed equity 
bases for a potential agreement. However, the role and importance of equity criteria in 
shaping the negotiation process has drawn only limited attention in the literature.  
This paper attempts to fill this gap by studying the importance of equity criteria in the 
formulation of negotiation positions of major parties in the UNFCCC process. It puts forward 
equity as an important structural element to understanding negotiation outcomes. We first 
advance bargaining theory to incorporate the self-serving use of equity. Agents are predicted 
to push equity principles which benefit them more than other parties, in particular those which 
are disadvantageous to parties with large bargaining power. Based on unique data from a 
world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, we then study how 
participants assess the support of the equity criteria by major parties in the climate 
negotiations. Comparing these results with cost estimates from a POLES model, we find that 
the perceived equity preferences of the respective countries or groups of countries are in 
general consistent with our hypothesis of a self-serving use of equity criteria and thereby lend 
support for our theoretical model. While this self-interest is recognized by the participants of 
our survey for the positions of the USA and the G77/China as well as Russia, the EU manages 
to be seen as choosing (self-serving) equity arguments out of fairness concerns and in order to 
facilitate the negotiations.  
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Abstract. This paper puts forward equity as an important structural element to understanding 
negotiation outcomes. We first advance bargaining theory to incorporate the self-serving use 
of equity. Agents are predicted to push equity principles which benefit them more than other 
parties, in particular those which are disadvantageous to parties with large bargaining power. 
Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate 
policy, we then study how participants assess the support of the equity criteria by major 
parties in the climate negotiations. Comparing these results with cost estimates from a POLES 
model, we find that the perceived equity preferences of the respective countries or groups of 
countries are in general consistent with our hypothesis of a self-serving use of equity criteria 
and thereby lend support for our theoretical model. While this self-interest is recognized by 
the participants of our survey for the positions of the USA and the G77/China as well as 
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concerns and in order to facilitate the negotiations.  
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 “We talk on principle but we act on interest.’’      
— William Savage Landor (1775-1864) 
 
1  Introduction 
Bargaining situations and negotiations frequently look like a strife for fairness. While 
bargainers are arguing to get their “fair share” when they feel disadvantaged, the meaning of 
“fair” is often heavily debated. Negotiations therefore become more complicated when there 
is more than one justifiable fairness norm (Raiffa 1982, p.268). Here, negotiators could 
potentially pick those fairness principles which justify additional demands from their side. 
Besides being prevalent in daily life, equity criteria are also ubiquitously used in the 
international arena when it comes to negotiating multilateral agreements. However, their role 
and importance in shaping the negotiation process has drawn only limited attention in the 
literature. This paper attempts to fill this gap by studying the importance of equity criteria in 
the formulation of negotiation positions of major parties in the UNFCCC (UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change) process. We both provide advances on bargaining theory by 
incorporating the self-serving use of equity and discuss empirical evidence based on a world-
wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy. 
Equity criteria are discussed in the literature in different ways. They are sometimes seen as 
guiding the negotiations (“focal points”, Schelling 1960) and thereby as means to reduce the 
negotiation costs. Bosello et al. (2001) study the stability of international agreements if based 
on a single equity rule but do not find major improvements upon the relatively pessimistic 
predictions from traditional economic models of coalition formation (Barrett 1994; Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1993; Hoel 1993). Lange and Vogt (2003) and Lange (2006) take a different 
approach and model preferences which trade-off payoffs with equity concerns. Such equity 
preferences can potentially increase cooperation rates but are based on the assumption that 
countries evaluate their position based on a single given equity criterion.  
However, in the international negotiations on the mitigation of climate change, different 
notions of equity have been proposed. The UNFCCC recognizes the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. Notions like “equal per capita 
emissions”, “polluter-pays”, or “sovereignty” all show different interpretations of fairness. 
Referring to this variety of equity criteria, Ringius et al. (2002, p. 3) state that “notions of 
fairness can provide a basis for an international regime only if there is a certain minimum of 
consensus among its members about what is fair and what is unfair”. 
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The perception of fairness may however differ across parties. Several strands of economic as 
well as psychological literature indicate that the understanding of what is fair is – at least to a 
certain extent – driven by economic costs of the respective equity rules: Babcock et al. (1995) 
consider this “self-serving bias in judgments of fairness” in an experimental bargaining 
situation. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) review psychological and experimental evidence 
for this interaction between fairness perceptions and material payoffs. Hennig-Schmidt (2002) 
shows the self-serving use of equity arguments in a video-bargaining experiment. When 
different conflicting fairness principles exist, the negotiations process therefore involves a 
weighing and reconciliation of the different proposed equity bases for a potential agreement. 
To our knowledge, this self-serving idea of equity use has not been incorporated into the 
theory of bargaining. 
In this paper we start with the hypothesis that equity criteria are used by the respective parties 
to influence the negotiations process in their own (material) self-interest. We assume that due 
to the consensus driven nature of international cooperation, parties back their proposals with 
some notion of equity in order to increase their acceptability in the negotiation process. 
Statements about fairness thereby legitimate further demands in the bargaining process and 
permit “the pursuit of self-interest with minimal condemnation or other costs” (Albin 2001, 
p.19). We assume that the use of equity arguments is self-serving, i.e. purely tactical. Just as 
traditional views on bargaining in the game-theoretic literature assume a balancing of 
conflicting demands by self-interested parties, the bargaining process in this paper is seen as 
balancing of demands where the bargaining power of the respective parties depends on the 
possibility of using self-serving equity criteria supporting their demands. We therefore 
understand the exercise in this paper as putting forward equity as an important structural 
element to understanding negotiation outcomes. 
Using our theory, we can show that agents will push equity notions which – on average – 
benefit them more than other parties. However, it could also be beneficial for a party to 
propose an equity principle which indicates that this party should receive a lesser surplus 
share if the equity criterion would be even more disadvantageous to other parties, in particular 
to those with large bargaining power. Our model also implies that it can be beneficial for a 
party to simultaneously support multiple equity criteria.  
After providing a theoretical basis for our study, we use the POLES model (Criqui 2001) to 
provide cost estimates when the allocation of abatement obligations across countries is 
governed by different equity criteria. We concentrate on the following major parties involved 
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in climate negotiations: the European Union (EU), the Group of 77 including China 
(G77/China), Russia, and the United States of America (USA). Given our hypothesis of self-
interested use of equity criteria, these cost estimates provide the basis for ranking the equity 
criteria with respect to their implied financial burdens for the respective countries or groups of 
countries. This generates our predictions for the use of equity in climate negotiations.  
We then consider unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international 
climate policy to assess the views of the negotiation positions of the respective countries or 
groups of countries. We find that the perceived equity preference is in general consistent with 
our hypothesis of a self-serving use of equity criteria. The EU, however, is seen as strongly 
supporting the poor losers rule as well. Looking into the implied costs of this rule, it becomes 
obvious that they are much larger for the USA and Russia than for the EU. Being “fair” 
therefore comes at a small price. The self-interested use of equity arguments by the parties is 
recognized by the participants of our survey for the USA and G77/China as well as Russia. 
The position of the European Union is seen as substantially driven by fairness notions and a 
desire to facilitate the negotiations.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the different 
equity principles in international climate policy. We then proceed to provide a theory for the 
link between equity use and bargaining power in section 3. In section 4, we estimate the 
economic costs of the different equity criteria when strictly applied to determine the allocation 
of abatement burdens across the countries or groups of countries. Section 5 discusses our 
empirical findings based on the survey data. The final section concludes. 
 
2  Equity principles in international climate policy 
The nature of the climate change problem allows decomposing policy decisions into those on 
the climate target (i.e., the aggregate greenhouse gas emission reductions) and those on the 
distribution of cost burdens which is crucial in evaluating the equity consequences of any 
given proposal. While the strength of the climate target is certainly a major criterion for the 
acceptability of any future international climate agreement, negotiations in the past centered 
to a large extent around questions on how the burdens of some global abatement effort should 
be distributed. In this paper, we concentrate on the issue of distributing a given burden or – 
equivalently – of distributing an exogenously given surplus from concluding the agreement.  
While the economic literature usually assumes that agents are exclusively concerned with the 
economic costs and benefits, equity arguments are frequently used in international 
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environmental negotiations. They can enter the negotiation position in different ways (Ringius 
et al. 2002, Albin 2001): actors might dislike being treated or treating others unfairly, equity 
could serve as constraint on the substantiation of bargaining positions, or equity criteria could 
serve as focal points. Consistent with payoff-maximizing behavior, in this paper we assume 
that the use of equity is driven by self-interest to influence the bargaining outcome in ones 
favor. 
In this sense, for example, developing countries as well as environmental interest groups in 
industrialized countries claim that developed countries with high per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions are responsible for global warming and must take the lead in combating climate 
change. As a consequence, weaker obligations or complete exemptions of developing 
countries from emission reduction targets can be based on equity arguments. Another 
dimension of equity issues is concerned with a fair distribution of burdens among countries 
with comparable per capita GDP and industry structure. Here, often similar reduction targets 
are seen as fair: some proposals during the international climate negotiations allocated 
emission reduction targets based on present or recent emission levels (Raymond, 2003).  
Several studies identify different typologies of equity principles. We follow Ringius et al. 
(2002) and concentrate on the following main equity principles which dominate the political 
and the academic debate on international climate policy: 
• The egalitarian rule (EGA): this rule incorporates the principle of equal per capita 
emissions. It implies that a country whose population amounts to x% of the global 
population should get x% of the global entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions. 
• The sovereignty rule (SOV): this rule incorporates the principle of equal percentage 
reduction of current emissions. It implies that a country whose greenhouse gas emissions 
amount to x% of the global greenhouse gas emissions should get x% of the global 
entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions.  
• The polluter-pays rule (POL): this rule incorporates the principle of equal ratio between 
abatement costs and emissions. It implies that a country whose greenhouse gas emissions 
amount to x% of the global emissions should bear x% of the global abatement costs for 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. 
• The ability-to-pay rule (ABI): this rule incorporates the principle of equal ratio between 
abatement costs and GDP. It implies that a country whose GDP amounts to x% of global 
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gross product should bear x% of the global abatement costs for reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
Besides these main equity rules there are often two further, accompanying principles 
discussed, namely (as we call them) the poor losers rule and the stand alone criterion:  
• The poor losers rule (POOR) can be seen as a principle of exemption due to GDP. It states 
that a poor country is exempted from any obligation for greenhouse gas emission 
reductions until a certain level of GDP per capita compared with the respective average of 
developed countries is reached.  
• The stand alone rule (STAL) can be seen as a principle of no excessive emission 
entitlements. It states that the entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions of a country are 
not higher than its business-as-usual greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
3  A theory on bargaining power and self-serving equity 
In Nash’s (1950) seminal work on bargaining, all the differences of the players were 
supposedly captured in the threat points and the shape of the bargaining set. Many other 
explanations for the bargaining power have been suggested since then – not least differences 
in time or risk preference (Roth 1979). However, if one follows many negotiation processes, 
parties often refer to “fairness” arguments in order to convince the other party to agree to their 
proposal.  
There is substantial evidence that the perception of “what is fair” is correlated with the 
economic costs and benefits implied by the respective equity notions (e.g., Babcock and 
Loewenstein 1997). These differing perceptions also show in the use of the respective equity 
principles as arguments in bargaining processes (Hennig-Schmidt 2001). According to 
Babcock and Loewenstein (1997), self interest affects what is perceived to be fair and is then 
traded off against moral correctness. Therefore, a self-serving perception of equity can be 
essential in explaining bargaining outcomes when a party successfully influences the 
bargaining process in its favor by referring to equity arguments.  
In this section we consider the bargaining process as a “black box” where the use of 
beneficiary equity arguments can shift the bargaining power in ones favor. We assume that 
there is a set of equity rules which can be defended with different ethical reasons. Now, if all 
these equity criteria would require for a country to receive a larger share of the surplus, this 
country is likely to be able to influence the bargaining outcome in its favor. Conversely, the 
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lack of an equity or fairness argument for one’s position would in our view result in a 
reduction of bargaining power. The end result of negotiations can therefore hardly be 
understood without analyzing the underlying equity notions: the bargaining power of the 
parties is linked to the availability of accepted notions of equity which back their positions. 
We illustrate these ideas on the role of equity in a pure bargaining setting. We study a 
cooperative game in which, for simplicity, we require unanimity. That is, the bargaining game 
is described by a set { }1,...,N = n  of players and a pair ( ,  where  is a subset of )S d S nIR  
representing the attainable payoffs to the players and  denotes the vector of outside 
options. We assume that {
nd IR∈
}|s S s d∈ ≥  is compact and non-empty. For our illustrating 
purposes we normalize  and 0d = { }1( ,..., ) | 1n ii NS s s s∈= =∑ , i.e.  is the unit n-simplex 
and describes the surplus shares of the individual players. 
S
The generalized Nash bargaining solution in this game would maximize 
1
1max ... ns S ns s
αα
∈     (1) 
where 0iα >  is a measure for the bargaining power and is driven by the risk and time 
preference of the respective player i N∈  (e.g. Roth 1979). The well-known solution would 
give 
i
i
jj N
s α α∈
= ∑   for all i N∈ .    (2) 
We can reinterpret this as a balance of power between the respective players. Given any 
proposal, each player tries to influence the bargaining outcome in her favor. The strength of 
this pull by player i  is proportional to the bargaining power parameter 0iα >  but also 
inversely related to the already obtained surplus. That is, condition (2) can be rewritten as  
ji
i js s
αα =   for all ,i j N∈ .    (3) 
which indicates the balance of forces to change the bargaining outcome in any direction. We 
will use this interpretation to illustrate the impact of equity notions. 
We assume that there is a set { }1,..., Tσ σΣ =  of morally justifiable, i.e. fair outcomes 
1( ,..., )
n
t t tn IRσ σ σ= ∈  with 1tjj Nσ∈ =∑  ( 1,...,t T= ). Note that we do not require that the 
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respective equitable shares tiσ  are positive, i.e. a specific equity criterion could indicate that a 
player should get a payoff lower than its outside option.  
We assume that each player can endorse some equity criteria, the strength of support of equity 
criterion tσ  by player  is denoted by j N∈ 0tjλ ≥ . Total support for equity criterion tσ  is 
given by . 0t tjj N λ∈Λ = ≥∑
We model the effect of this use of equity as providing additional forces to change the current 
proposal in the directions given by the respective equity criteria such that the balance of 
power in condition (3) is changed to  
( ) (ji t ti i t tj jt t
i j
s s
s s
)
αα σ σ+ Λ − = + Λ −∑ ∑   for all ,i j N∈    (4) 
We offer two alternative interpretations of condition (4) which differ in the view of the effect 
of equity on the bargaining situation. On the one hand, condition (4) can be motivated from a 
(asymmetric) Nash-bargaining solution arg max ( ( ) ( )) is S i i i ii N u s u d
α
∈ ∈ −∏  when agents have 
self-serving preferences for equity given by 2( ) exp ( ) / 2i i i t ti itu s s sσ⎡ ⎤= − Λ −⎣ ⎦∑ .1 On the 
other hand, condition (4) is obtained from an increase in the bargaining power depending on 
the availability of self-serving equity arguments: in the Nash-bargaining solution, bargaining 
power could be measured as the slope of the indifference curve of the Cobb-Douglas function 
which is given by 
/
/
/
j j
j i
i i
s
du du
s
α
α=  (see (1)). This indifference curve now gets steeper if 
player i uses self-serving equity arguments, it is flatter if agent j uses equity notions to her 
advantage.2  
We can now use condition (4) to discuss the effects of using equity to support the respective 
bargaining positions. We first consider two limiting cases. As said above, without considering 
                                                
i
1  Note, however, that this utility structure could generally result in a non-convex bargaining set in the utility 
space. Here, we follow Zhou (1996) who generalizes the Nash bargaining solution to non-convex sets. Zhou 
(1996) assumes the bargaining set to be closed, comprehensive and bounded from above. The (asymmetric) Nash 
bargaining solution is then given by ( , ) arg max ( ) iS ii NF S d u d
α
μ∈ ∈∈ −∏  where iα  gives the surplus 
share if the bargaining set is the unit simplex (with threat point 0d = ). It is implied by the following axioms: 
(i) invariance with respect to positive affine transformations, (ii) strict individual rationality, and (iii) 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
2 Note that similar interpretations are usually offered Nash-bargaining solutions for risk-averse decision makers. 
Either one considers the utility space of risk averse decision makers ( ( ) ii i iu s s
α= ) and keeps the symmetric 
Nash bargaining solution, or – alternatively – keeps the unit simplex as bargaining space and implements the 
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution given by arg max ( ) is S i ii N s d
α
∈ ∈ −∏ . 
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equity (  for all t ), we obtain 0tΛ = /i i j Ns jα α∈= ∑ . Fixing the relative importance of the 
equity criteria at  (where ) and considering tΛ
r r
1ll Λ =∑ t tφΛ = Λr , we obtain from (4)  
( )ii t tit
i
s
s
c
ασ φφ= Λ + −∑
r
 for all i   (5) N∈
where 1( ) 0i
i N
i
c
n s
αφ φ∈= ∑ > . This implies that for φ → ∞ , i.e. an infinite weight on equity 
i t tit
s σ= Λ − c∑ rr r  for all i N∈  with 0is >r    (6) 
while  for  with t tit cσΛ ≤∑ r r i N∈ 0is =r  where we denote the limits by  etc. 
Straightforward calculation gives 
limi is sφ→∞=r
: 0
0
1 0
j
t tjj s t
c
n
σ=
>
= − Λ∑ ∑r ≥rr  where { }0 # : 0jn j s> = >r  
denotes the number of players with positive shares. That is, countries get their “fair” share 
less a constant and those countries for which this would imply a negative share receive zero.  
More specifically, if the weighted equity criterion indicates that all countries get a positive 
share, they will receive exactly this equitable share. If, however, the weighted equity criterion 
indicates that a party should receive a negative amount, i.e. less than its outside option, then 
this country receives zero surplus. As this increase in surplus compared to the “fair” share has 
to be deducted evenly from all other countries, it could happen that countries with a positive, 
but small t tit σΛ∑ r
: 0})σr r r
 also receive a zero share. This will be the case for a country i if 
.  
: 0
0 /( #{
t tjt
t tj t tj t tjt j t t
n jσσ σΛ << Λ ≤ − Λ − Λ <∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑r
We summarize these results in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: If the weight on equity criteria gets infinitely large, all countries receive their 
equitable share minus a constant. Some countries might receive zero payoffs, in particular 
those for which the weighted criterion indicates that they should receive less than their 
outside option. 
 
An application where an equity criterion could indicate a negative surplus share would be the 
egalitarian criterion. If one applies this rule strictly, the developing countries would receive an 
allocation of allowances which leaves industrialized countries facing substantial costs and 
therefore most likely negative net benefits from climate policy. Therefore, this criterion could 
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not be applied in a strict way. However, it is more than questionable that the bargaining power 
would imply an infinite weight on such an equity criterion: there are alternative equity criteria 
which could be supported in favor of industrialized countries. We now consider which 
country would have incentives to support the respective equity notions. 
For this, we study the derivative of condition (4) with respect to tΛ . Simple calculus gives the 
following formula: 
2 ( ) (
i i
t ti i j tjt j N
t i
ds s s
d s
α σ μ σ∈
⎛ ⎞+ Λ = − − −⎜ ⎟Λ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ )j    (7) 
where 
2
2
1/
1/
j
tt
j
j
l
tl N t
l
s
s
α
μ α
∈
⎛ ⎞+ Λ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝= ⎛ ⎞
⎠
+ Λ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑ ∑
     (8) 
Condition (7) immediately implies that a country benefits from supporting an equity criterion, 
if its distance from the fair share is larger than the μ -weighted distance of other countries. 
Therefore, the country with the maximal ti isσ −  will definitely benefit from an increased 
weight on equity criterion tσ , the country with the smallest (negative) ti isσ −  will lose. 
However, condition (7) also implies that a country i might even benefit from supporting a 
specific equity criterion if this equity criterion implies that it should get less (if ti isσ <  but 
). The reason is that other countries might have an even worse 
position regarding this particular equity criterion such that relatively the bargaining power 
shifts towards country i. We will later see that such a situation might apply to the EU when 
supporting the egalitarian principle: the EU has an above average per capita greenhouse gas 
emission level, its position compared to other industrialized countries would benefit from the 
application of this criterion. To get some better insights in the effects of supporting a 
particular equity criterion, we now consider a couple of special cases based on the assumption 
that so far no equity criterion is used. 
0 ti i j tj jj Nsσ μ σ∈> − > −∑ ( )s
For the case where  for all , and, for simplicity, normalizing 0tΛ = t 1jjα =∑ , condition (7) 
reduces to: 
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1 ( ) ( )
( ) (var( ) cov( ,
i
ti i j tj jj N
t i
ti i j j tj
ds
d
n
σ α α σ αα
σ α α α σ
∈= − − −Λ
= − + −
∑
))
   (9) 
Country i therefore benefits from the use of an equity criterion, if the equity notion implies 
that country i is more disadvantaged than an α -weighted average of all countries. In 
particular, if the equity criterion indicates that countries with large bargaining power should 
get less surplus ( cov( , ) var( )j tj jα σ < α ), even a country for which 0ti iσ α− <  could benefit 
from this equity criterion. Conversely, if cov( , ) var( )j tj jα σ > α , country i could be worse off 
even if 0ti iσ α− > . If, however, all countries have identical bargaining power in absence of 
equity use, i.e. 1/j nα =  for all j, then country i would benefit from pushing an equity 
criterion if and only if 1/ti nσ > . 
We can summarize our results in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: A country can benefit from an increased weight on a specific equity criterion, 
if its distance from the implied equitable share is larger than a weighted average of other 
countries’ distances. A country might benefit even though the equity criterion implies a 
smaller share. Conversely, a country’s position might deteriorate even though the used equity 
criterion implies a larger share for the country. 
 
Note however, that these counterintuitive effects of pushing a favorable equity criterion can 
only occur in a multilateral bargaining setting. If one faces a bilateral bargaining situation, a 
country should always push those equity rules which imply a larger surplus share ( ti isσ > ). 
We finally turn to the question whether a country should support more than one equity 
criterion when it has limited resources, i.e. a larger weight on one equity criterion necessarily 
implies less support for the other and there is an implicit budget constraint on supporting 
equity criteria: ti itλ λ≤∑ . Condition (7) implies that: 
'
'
2
( ) (ti j tj t i j t jj N j Ni i
it t
tt
i
ds ds
d d
s
σ μ σ σ μ σ
α
∈ ∈− − −− =Λ Λ + Λ
' )∑ ∑
∑
   (10) 
One should therefore always support the criterion t for which ti j tjj Nσ μ σ∈−∑  is maximized. 
That is, a country chooses to support a criterion for which the difference between the implied 
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share and the weighted share of other countries is maximal. If simultaneously supporting two 
different equity notions t  and  ( 0't tiλ >  and ' 0t iλ > ) is optimal, then 
'
i
t t
ds ds
d d
=Λ Λ
i
'
 or 
'ti j tj t i j t jj N j N
σ μ σ σ μ σ∈− = −∑ ∑ ∈  necessarily holds in the optimum. In such a situation, a 
country implicitly pushes a weighted average of different equity criteria.  
 
Example 1: Consider a set of  agents with bargaining weights 3n = (1/ 3,  1/ 3,  1/ 3)α =  or 
(1/ 3,  1/ 9,  5 / 9)α = , respectively. Without any weight on equity, player 1 would receive a 
surplus share of . We assume that there are two equity criteria  and 
. That is, the equitable share for agent 1 is always 
1 1/ 3s = 1 (0.5,  0.5,  0)s =
2 (0.5,  0,  0.5)s = 1 0.5tσ =  while the equity 
criteria differ in the share assigned to agent 2 and 3. Figure 1 gives the payoff to player 1 for 
different weights on equity, 1 2( , ) • (1- , )φ π πΛ Λ =  for {1,  5,  10}φ ∈  which are calculated 
based on condition (4). Figure 1 shows that player 1 has incentives to support both equity 
rules. The weight to which she wants to support equity criterion 1 (0.5,  0.5,  0)s =  vs. equity 
criterion  depends on the initial bargaining power 2 (0.5,  0,  0.s = 5) α  of the other two 
players: for (1/ 3,  1/ 3,  1/ 3)α = , player 1 optimally supports both equity principles to the 
same extent. If the bargaining power of player 3 is increasing, player 1 should shift the 
support of equity criteria towards criterion 2, which implicitly hurts player 3 and therefore 
reduces the initially large bargaining power of player 3. For (1/ 3,  1/ 9,  5 / 9)α =  and 1φ = , 
player 1 would only support equity rule 1. 
 
Figure 1: Surplus share of player 1 as a function of his relative support of equity criterion 2 
vs. criterion 1. Panel (a) is based on (1/ 3,  1/ 3,  1/ 3)α = , panel (b) on (1/ 3,  1/ 9,  5 / 9)α = .  
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Example 1 illustrates that a player might choose to support different equity principles with the 
respective weights depending on the potential to reduce the bargaining power of other players. 
We summarize our result in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: A country should support an equity criterion which maximizes the distance 
between its “fair” share and the weighted share of other players. It could be beneficial for a 
country to support more than one equity criterion. Players optimally shift their support of 
equity criteria in response to differing bargaining power α . 
 
Note that in the theory we discussed only equity criteria which explicitly determine the 
distribution of surplus. In our empirical section we consider four main equity criteria which 
fall into this category (egalitarian, sovereignty, ability-to-pay, and polluter-pays). In addition, 
we study accompanying principles (poor losers and stand alone). These accompanying 
principles fully specify a distribution of surplus only in combination with the main equity 
criteria. Therefore, a country could very well want to support a combination of one main with 
one accompanying equity principle.  
 
4  The economic costs of different equity principles 
In order to produce predictions on the preferred equity criteria of the respective parties, we 
now turn to an assessment of the involved costs. We concentrate on CO2 emissions and 
assume that the aggregate emissions target is fixed at different levels and an emissions trading 
system equalizes the marginal abatement costs across all countries. For any given overall 
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target (or equivalently, any given marginal abatement costs), the different equity criteria 
therefore imply a specific distribution of surplus but have no efficiency effects. In order to 
assess the distributions implied by the egalitarian, sovereignty, polluter-pays, ability-to-pay 
and the accompanying rules of poor losers and stand alone, we use information on abatement 
costs in the respective countries or groups of countries, population data, baseline carbon 
dioxide emissions, and GDP. 
Our projections for GDP, emissions and populations for 2020 are based on DOE (2005). The 
mapping of the International Energy Outlook regions is described in Table A.1 (Appendix A). 
The GDP, CO2 emissions, and populations in the reference case for 1990 and 2002, as well as 
the projections for 2020 are summarized for our model countries or groups of countries in 
Table A.2 (Appendix A). Table A.2 also states an accumulated measure of emissions between 
1860 and 2002 which are taken from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (WRI 2005) and 
updated to 2020 using DOE (2005). Marginal abatement cost curves for 2020 are generated 
based on data from the POLES model, which embodies a detailed bottom-up description of 
regional energy markets and world-energy trade (Criqui 2001). Table A.3 (Appendix A) 
summarizes the abatement cost information for 2020 from POLES. Table A.2 and Table A.3 
contain all relevant data which we use to calculate allowance allocations, total costs and costs 
per capita for the different global abatement scenarios (permit prices) in 2020.  
The formulas for the allocation of allowances under the different equity rules are implemented 
as follows: for each country or group of countries { }EU, USA, Russia, G77/China∈i , we 
denote for 2020 the business as usual emissions as , the GDP as , and the 
population level as . As we assume that any abatement scenario is implemented at 
minimal costs, i.e. with identical marginal abatement costs, the resulting permit price  
defines the optimal allocation of abatement  for each i  with resulting abatement costs 
 The aggregate levels of all variables are denoted as , , , 
2020
ie
2020
iGDP
2020
iPOP
p
( )ia p
( )iAC p
2020E 2020GDP 2020POP ( )A p , 
and ( )AC p , respectively. With this we can calculate the permit allocation ( )ie p  which is 
induced by the respective equity criteria. This allocation solves:3 
                                                
3 Note that the total burden to a country is given by its abatement costs plus the payments for emission permit in 
excess off its allocation.: 2020( ) ( ( ) ( ))i i i iAC p p e a p e p+ − − ,  
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2020
2020 2020
2020
2020 2020
2020
2020 2020
( ) ( )EGA                         
( ) ( )SOV                         
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )ABI                         
POL      
i
i
i
i
i i i i
i
e p E A p
POP POP
e p E A p
e E
AC p p e a p e p AC p
GDP GDP
−=
−=
+ − − =
2020
2020 2020
( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )                   i i i i
i
AC p p e a p e p AC p
e E
+ − − =
 (11) 
For the additional criteria poor losers and stand alone we require that the net burden is zero 
for G77/China, i.e. 2020G77/China G77/China G77/China G77/China( ) ( ( ) ( )) 0AC p p e a p e p+ − − = . The allocation 
to the remaining countries or groups of countries is adjusted accordingly such that the 
respective left hand sides in (11) are equalized for { }EU, USA, Russia∈i . Furthermore, we 
discuss the version of the polluter-pays principle based on the cumulated (historical and 
future) CO2 emissions between 1860 and 2020. The corresponding formula for POL(1860-2020) 
can be obtained from (11) by replacing the denominators of the POL equation by cumulated 
emissions. 
The resulting economic costs of strictly applying the equity criteria for the respective 
countries or groups of countries can be seen in Figures A.1 to A.4 (Appendix A). 
 
Hypotheses on the EU 
Figure A.1 shows clearly that a strict application of the egalitarian principle would be most 
cost intensive for the EU. Without accompanying equity rules, the EU would prefer the 
polluter-pays or, secondly, the ability-to-pay principle. If, however, exceptions for G77/China 
are granted such that those countries would be free of obligations (POOR) but also would be 
held at their original welfare level (STAL), the ranking of the equity criteria for the EU 
changes. With the stand alone and poor losers rules, the EU is predicted to prefer the 
egalitarian notion, followed by POL, SOV, and ABI. The total ranking for the EU is given by  
(1860-2020)
STAL POOR POOR POOREGA POL ABI SOV POL POL SOV ABI EGAf f f f f f f f  
This reversal from the special treatment of developing countries occurs because the EU has a 
relatively low per capita emission level when compared to other industrialized countries. The 
use of equity criteria by the EU is therefore predicted to heavily depend on the way 
developing countries are included in the agreement. As an alternative to granting exemptions 
to developing countries, the EU might also push a version of the polluter-pays principle which 
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accounts for the historical, i.e. cumulated emissions: the costs implied by POL(1860-2020) are 
less than those from combining any other criterion with the poor losers principle.  
 
Hypotheses on the USA 
Figure A.2 demonstrates that applying the egalitarian principle, with and without the 
accompanying rule, would be extremely cost intensive. The USA are therefore predicted to 
strictly oppose this criterion. The USA can also be predicted to reject the accompanying poor 
losers principle since its application would substantially increase costs. The remaining equity 
rules do not differ substantially in their associated costs. The total ranking is given by  
(1860-2020)
POOR POOR POOR STALABI POL SOV POL ABI SOV POL EGA EGAf f f f f f f f   
It should be noted that the preference for the ability-to-pay principle clearly depends on the 
assumed economic growth of the specific countries in the world. If this criterion were applied 
based on today’s comparisons in GDP, then the burden implied for the USA would be 
substantially larger. 
 
Hypotheses on Russia 
Figure A.3 indicates that Russia would join the USA in opposing the application of the 
egalitarian principle even if accompanied with the stand alone criterion. Russia has lowest 
costs if the sovereignty, or secondly the ability-to-pay criterion is applied. The complete 
ranking of rules is given by  
(1860-2020)
POOR POOR POOR STALSOV ABI POL SOV POL ABI POL EGA EGA≈f f f f f f f   
The costs increase for Russia from the poor losers principle is also substantial such that 
Russia could be predicted to oppose exemptions of developing countries. When using equity 
arguments in its self-interest, Russia is therefore predicted to prefer the sovereignty or ability-
to-pay principle and to strictly oppose the egalitarian principle. 
 
Hypotheses on G77/China 
We finally discuss the costs which are implied by the different equity rules for G77/China. 
Figure A.4 indicates these burdens. The ranking of the criteria is given as follows: 
(1860-2020)
STAL POOR POOR POOREGA EGA ABI SOV POL POL SOV ABI POL= = = ≈f f f f  
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It is obvious that G77/China would profit most from a strict application of the egalitarian 
principle. If acknowledging that the huge welfare transfers which are implied by EGA are not 
a feasible outcome of the negotiations, G77/China would agree to using EGA combined with 
STAL or to using any of the other equity criteria if accompanied by exemptions for poor 
countries. Further, G77/China would oppose a strict application of the polluter-pays and 
ability-to-pay principles. The latter is based on the predicted economic growth of G77/China 
over the next decades such that the ability-to-pay rule would be increased. Developing 
countries could, however, support POL(1860-2020). 
 
General comments 
Negotiations on climate change are clearly targeted towards a long term climate policy. Any 
acceptance of an equity criterion with accompanying principles like poor losers, could set a 
precedence for shaping future agreements. The ranking of POL, SOV, and ABI may therefore 
be largely driven by such a long run perspective, even if in the short run exemptions for 
developing countries are granted. EGA seems to be an exceptional case: the USA and Russia 
would suffer substantially higher costs than from other criteria even with an accompanying 
stand alone principle. The EU, however, should be in favor of this criterion if the stand alone 
criterion is applied to the developing countries.  
 
 
5  Empirical analysis 
In this paper, we are clearly far from “proving” our theory on the strategic use of equity 
criteria. However, in order to get some support for our hypotheses we conducted an empirical 
analysis on the perception of the negotiation position of the EU, G77/China, Russia, and the 
USA. For the success of the agreements, it is important how the negotiation positions are 
perceived by the respective participants in negotiations. We therefore assess the perception of 
the positions of countries or groups of countries regarding equity instead of looking through 
the proposals made by the respective parties (see Reiner and Jacoby 1997). 
The data for our empirical analysis stem from a world-wide survey which was carried out 
with the help of a standardized questionnaire and which was sent in 2004 via e-mail to 1695 
agents involved in climate policy. The addresses were taken from official UN documents 
available in the Internet, for example, different climate policy and IPCC workshops. Of the 
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1695 contacted persons, 230 participated in the survey.4 This is a fairly typical participation 
rate for surveys with individuals which are not interviewed face-to-face. The participants 
obtained an individual login and password for an Internet questionnaire. This procedure of 
sending out passwords allowed us to control the access to the survey and, in particular, 
ensured that each participant could fill out the questionnaire only once. Alternatively, the 
participants could fill out a Word-document or PDF and send it back via e-mail or postal mail. 
After explaining the six equity rules (see section 2), the questionnaire consists of two parts. 
While the first part addresses the individual views on equity (these data are analyzed in Lange 
et al. 2007), the second part studies the perceptions of the negotiation position of the EU, 
G77/China, Russia, and the USA by the participants. This second part is the basis of our 
empirical analysis in this paper.  
For each of the six equity rules, we first asked to which degree the respective countries or 
groups of countries are expected to favor incorporating the specified rule in international 
climate agreements on entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions. We concentrated on a time 
horizon of no more than 20 years. We differentiated between “a very high degree”, “a high 
degree”, “a moderate degree”, “a low degree”, and “no degree”.  
Second, we asked which of the four main equity rules “egalitarian”, “sovereignty”, “polluter-
pays”, and “ability-to-pay” is expected to be most important for the respective countries or 
groups of countries (again regarding a time horizon of no more than 20 years).  
Third, we asked whether the following reasons are expected to play an important role for the 
respective countries or groups of countries concerning their position on incorporating this 
most important equity rule: (i) material self-interest, (ii) fairness considerations of the public, 
(iii) facilitation of international climate negotiations, (iv) pressure from industry, or (v) 
pressure from environmental NGO’s.  
Finally, the questionnaire comprised some questions about the individual background, in 
particular regarding the nationality. 
 
Results 
                                                
4 It should be noted that some of the 230 participants in the survey did not answer all questions such that the 
number of observations in the empirical analysis is smaller. 
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Table B.1 (Appendix B) reports for each country or group of countries the relative frequencies 
that the respective equity principles should be reflected in the distribution of entitlements for 
greenhouse gas emissions to “a very high degree” or “a high degree”. Table B.2 shows the 
relative frequencies regarding the most important equity rule. 
The position of the EU is largely perceived as being driven by the polluter-pays principle 
(78.2% of all respondents, see Table B.1). Accordingly, 54.6% of the participants see this as 
the most important equity rule for the EU (see Table B.2). This coincides with the prominent 
position which this criterion was predicted to have according to the cost estimates in the 
previous section. The relative frequencies for the sovereignty and the ability-to-pay rule are 
rather similar according to Table B.1 (50.9% vs. 55.7%). The sovereignty rule is seen by 
22.4% as the most important equity criterion for the EU, while the ability-to-pay principle is 
perceived by only 10.9% of the respondents as the most important rule (see Table B.2). Thus, 
the ranking of the most important equity rule can completely be explained by the self-interest 
as discussed in the previous section.  
Additionally, the EU is perceived by 53.3% of all participants (see Table B.1) as being 
supportive towards exemptions based on the poor losers principle. This differs substantially 
from the other industrialized countries (29.9% of the participants for the USA and 34.0% for 
Russia, see Table B.1). This perception coincides with the prevalent view that – at least in the 
past – the EU was trying to establish itself as a leader in international climate policy and also 
was willing to grant exemptions to developing countries. Here, the positions of the EU and 
G77/China are obviously in line. Interestingly, however, the egalitarian notion is perceived as 
relatively less supported by the EU. Although this is consistent with the cost estimates, the 
favorable combination of EGA and STAL is apparently not strongly perceived as being 
supported by the EU.  
Turning to the perceived position of G77/China it is interesting to note that the position is 
largely consistent with arguments which reduce the abatement burdens of these countries: 
above all they are seen as claiming exemptions for poor losers (79.0% of respondents, Table 
B.1). According to Table B.2, the egalitarian notion is seen as the most important equity 
criterion (37.9% of the participants) for G77China, followed by ABI (31.0% of the 
participants) and POL (23.0% of the participants). This ranking deviates from the predictions 
based on our cost estimates: both the polluter-pays as well as the ability-to-pay rule are seen 
as receiving large support although they imply large costs. This result could only be consistent 
with economic self-interest of G77/China if the polluter-pays principle is based on a 
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cumulated emissions measure (POL(1860-2020)) and/or that survey participants do not take into 
account the economic changes over the next decades. Interestingly, the sovereignty principle 
is perceived to be less supported by G77/China (29.1% in Table B.1; 8.0% in Table B.2).  
We now turn to the perceived position of the USA. Most obviously, it is seen that the USA 
supports to a less extent the poor losers rule (29.9% of all participants as compared to 53.3% 
for the EU, see Table B.1). The sovereignty principle is perceived as supported most by the 
USA (60.8% of the respondents according to Table B.1 and 52.7% according to Table B.2). 
That is, the USA is perceived as demanding similar reduction efforts from all countries. In 
fact, this is consistent with the major official reasons for not ratifying the Kyoto protocol as 
the USA demanded meaningful participation of developing countries. The polluter-pays 
principle is seen as getting much less support than the sovereignty criterion (41.0% of the 
participants according to Table B.1 and 24.2% according to Table B.2), also when compared 
to the EU. This cannot sufficiently be explained with self-serving equity notions unless 
participants interpreted POL as being based on emissions cumulated over time. The 
egalitarian criterion is basically seen as being rejected by the USA – much in line with the 
hypothesis in the previous section, similarly to the ability-to-pay principle. The latter is 
surprising as in the long run this criterion would potentially benefit the USA if the predicted 
economic growth of developing countries materializes.  
We finally discuss the perceived position of Russia. First, Russia is seen as supporting the 
accompanying principles to a lesser extent (34.0% of all participants for POOR and 29.4% for 
STAL, see Table B.1). The expected strong support for the ability-to-pay criterion (52.8% of 
the respondents) and the sovereignty notion (54.3% of the respondents) according to Table 
B.1 is consistent with the hypothesis of self-interest driven use of equity criteria. The ranking 
regarding the perceived desire to incorporate the equity rules and the ranking regarding the 
most important equity rule is exactly in line with the ranking given by our cost estimates for 
Russia. 
 
Result 1: The perceived support for specific equity rules differ across countries or groups of 
countries. The USA is seen as favoring the sovereignty rule and, thereby, the inclusion of all 
countries, while other groups of countries are seen as being in favor of exemptions for poor 
losers (G77/China, EU). The respective supported equity notions are in large consistent with 
self-interest for the EU and Russia. The relative support of the polluter pays principle by the 
USA and G77/China is only consistent with self-interest if based on cumulated emissions over 
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time. The strong support of the EU of the poor losers rule as an accompanying principle runs 
contrary to full self-interest.  
 
It should be noted that Table B.1 and B.2 also report the decomposed relative frequencies for 
respondents from the EU and from G77/China.5 The tables show that the corresponding 
relative frequencies can differ between all respondents, the respondents from the EU, and the 
respondents from G77/China. For example, participants from the EU expect the EU to support 
STAL clearly less than participants from outside the EU (see Table B.1). Furthermore, 
G77/China is seen as supporting the incorporation of SOV to a very high or high degree by a 
larger fraction of respondents from G77/China than participants from outside G77/China (see 
also Table B.1).6  
While we have found that the perceived positions of countries or groups of countries are 
largely consistent with a self-interest hypothesis, it is interesting to see whether this self-
serving equity use is unmasked by the public. Table B.3 (Appendix B) reports the relative 
frequencies that material self interest and other reasons (fairness considerations of the public; 
facilitation of international climate negotiations; pressure from industry; pressure from 
environmental NGO’s) play an important role for the incorporation of the most important 
equity rule in international climate negotiations 
Consistent with the analysis above, the expected main driving force for using the most 
important equity rule by G77/China, Russia, and the USA is material self-interest (86.1%, 
88.9%, 93.5% of all respondents). Interestingly, the answers depend on the nationality of the 
participants: 75.3% of the participants from G77/China state that material self-interest plays 
an important role for the use of equity criteria by G77/China, while 96.8% of the participants 
from the EU perceive material self-interest playing an important role in the position of 
G77/China.7 The corresponding EU position is seen by 51.9% of the participants from the EU 
as material self-interest driven while 70.8% of the participants from G77/China see the EU as 
                                                
5  The numbers of participants from Russia and the USA are too small for a meaningful decomposition for these 
two countries. 
6 The corresponding chi-squared tests in Table B.1 examine whether the distribution of the expected degree of 
incorporation of the respective equity rules (with parameter values “a very high degree”, “a high degree”, “a 
moderate degree”, “a low degree”, and “no degree”) differs between the respondents from the EU (or, 
alternatively, from G77/China) and the corresponding respondents from outside the EU (or, alternatively, from 
outside G77/China). Similarly, the chi-squared tests in Table B.2 examine whether the expected distribution of 
the most important equity rule (with parameter values “EGA”, “SOV”, “POL”, and “ABI”) differs between the 
respondents from the EU (or, alternatively, from G77/China) and the corresponding respondents from outside the 
EU (or, alternatively, from outside G77/China). 
7 The corresponding chi-squared tests also show that the relative frequencies for the respondents from the EU 
(or, alternatively, from G77/China) significantly differ from the relative frequencies for the respondents from 
outside the EU (or, alternatively, from outside G77/China). 
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using self-serving equity arguments. This finding is consistent with the self-serving bias 
which has been found in several experimental studies (see introduction). 
For the USA and Russia, pressure from industry is also perceived as playing an essential role 
(83.9% and 69.7% of all respondents). The incorporation of the most important equity 
principle by the EU is seen to be motivated by material self interest to a lesser extent. Rather, 
87.9% of all participants expect that fairness considerations of the public and 78.9% of all 
respondents expect that pressure from environmental NGO’s play an important role. 
Corresponding to the perception of the EU as a primary driving player in international climate 
negotiations, the reason of its use of equity rules is observed as a facilitator of international 
climate negotiations (83.1% of the respondents).  
 
Result 2: G77/China, Russia, and the USA are perceived to use equity rules primarily out of 
material self-interest. The USA and Russia are also seen to be driven by industrial interest 
groups. The EU is seen to use equity arguments due to fairness considerations of the public, 
pressure from environmental NGO’s, and in order to facilitate the international climate 
negotiations.  
 
Result 3: Differences in the expectations of participants on a use of equity principles out of 
material self-interest is consistent with a self-serving bias: participants from the EU 
(G77/China) perceive the position of the EU (G77/China) to be less driven by material self-
interest than participants not coming from the respective groups of countries.  
 
The perception of the respective countries or groups of countries sheds an interesting light on 
the role of equity as seen by the participants of our survey. Although the perceived position of 
the EU is by large consistent with a self-serving use of equity arguments, the EU manages to 
be seen as a facilitator of negotiations and as being driven by fairness considerations of the 
public and pressure from environmental NGO’s. The reason for this could be the perceivably 
relative strong support of the accompanying poor losers principle by the EU. This support 
clearly is not consistent with pure self interest – although the costs of supporting it are 
relatively small when compared to the costs implied for the USA and Russia. A major part of 
the negotiation was dealing with the participation of developing countries which are seen to 
strongly oppose major costs and to support the poor losers criterion. The perceived position of 
the EU is therefore indeed in between those of G77/China and the USA such that taking the 
role of being a facilitator comes at relatively small costs for the EU. 
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 6  Conclusions 
In this paper we put forward equity as an important structural element to understanding 
negotiation outcomes using the example of climate negotiations. We implemented the idea of 
self-serving use of equity in a bargaining model which guided our analysis. Our data from an 
international survey largely confirms our predictions based on a cost-ranking of the respective 
equity criteria for the different countries or groups of countries: the perceived support of 
equity criteria appears to be the stronger the less costly this criterion is compared to 
alternatives. Interestingly, the EU is seen as supporting the poor losers criterion which runs 
contrary to its self-interest. It could be this support which leads our participants to state that 
on average the EU is more seen as facilitating the negotiations and acting out of fairness 
considerations instead of following its material benefits. The USA, Russia, and G77/China are 
largely seen as pursuing their own self-interest.  
While the findings in this study indicate that equity notions in international negotiations are 
mostly correlated with the self-interest of the negotiating parties, the question remains why 
exactly their use can influence the negotiation process. Our model gives a first illustration of a 
possible interaction between bargaining power and the potential of a favorable use of equity 
principles. We believe that this role of using equity criteria will be essential in generating a 
better understanding of bargaining processes – not only on climate policy. This study thereby 
opens interesting potential for further research. 
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Appendix A – Abatement costs and predictions 
 
Table A.1: International Energy Outlook regions and mapping to survey countries or groups 
of countries 
International Energy Outlook regions  Survey countries or groups of countries 
United States of America USA 
Other North America ROW 
Western Europe EU 
Mature market Asia ROW 
Russia Russia 
Other former Soviet Union ROW  
Eastern Europe EU 
Emerging Asia G77/China 
Middle East G77/China 
Africa G77/China 
Central and south America G77/China 
Source: DOE (2005) 
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Table A.2: GDP, population, and carbon emissions for survey countries or groups of 
countries  
 Year EU G77/China Russia USA ROW World 
GDP 1990 8160 9871 2241 7113 5688 33073 
(Billion USD2000) 2002 10484 18449 1657 10075 6562 47227 
 2020 15816 46555 3571 17634 11006 94582 
Population 1990 498 3965 148 253 396 5260 
(Million) 2002 513 4891 144 289 429 6266 
 2020 514 6092 129 337 460 7532 
Emissions 1990 1229 1664 640 1361 959 5853 
(MtC) 2002 1166 2566 415 1568 942 6658 
 2020 1299 4767 538 2035 1186 9825 
Accumulated Emissions   1860-  98 115 32 117 75 438 
(GtC) 2020       
Source: Own calculations based on DOE (2005) and WRI (2005) 
 
 
Table A.3: Summary of abatement cost assumptions in 2020 
Marginal Abatement Costs (USD2000/tC)   
  40 80 120 160 200 40 80 120 160 200 
Countries 
(groups of 
countries) 
Abatement (MtC) 
 
Total abatement costs  
(Bn USD2000) 
EU 72 128 175 216 250 1.4 4.7 9.4 15.0 21.2 
G77/China 502 860 1137 1365 1558 9.5 30.7 58.2 89.9 124.7 
Russia 63 109 142 167 190 1.2 3.9 7.1 10.7 14.7 
USA 155 270 362 437 502 2.9 9.8 18.9 29.4 41.0 
ROW 64 112 151 181 209 1.2 4.0 7.9 12.1 17.0 
WORLD 856 1480 1967 2366 2709 16.2 53.1 101.5 157.2 218.7 
Source: Own calculations based on POLES (Criqui 2001) 
 
 
- 27 - 
Figure A.1: Costs in 2020 implied by the respective equity criteria for the EU (in % of GDP)  
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Figure A.2: Costs in 2020 implied by the respective equity criteria for the USA (in % of 
GDP). 
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Figure A.3: Costs in 2020 implied by the respective equity criteria for Russia (in % of GDP). 
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Figure A.4: Costs in 2020 implied by the respective equity criteria for G77/China (in % of 
GDP). 
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Appendix B – Results 
 
Table B.1: Relative frequencies that the respective equity criteria should be reflected in the 
distribution of entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions to “a very high degree” or “a high 
degree” 
Equity rule EGA SOV POL ABI POOR STAL 
Expectation about the EU 
All             
respondents 
40.1% 
(n=167) 
50.9% 
(n=167) 
78.2% 
(n=174) 
55.7% 
(n=174) 
53.3% 
(n=169) 
32.5% 
(n=151) 
Respondents 
from the EU 
36.5%*** 
(n=63) 
42.9% 
(n=63) 
79.1%  
(n=67) 
54.5%** 
(n=66)  
54.7% 
(n=64) 
18.2%** 
(n=55) 
Respondents 
from G77/China 
46.0%** 
(n=74) 
50.7% 
(n=73) 
76.6% 
(n=77) 
60.3%** 
(n=78) 
55.4% 
(n=74) 
43.3%** 
(n=67) 
Expectation about G77/China 
All             
respondents 
59.5% 
(n=173) 
29.1% 
(n=172) 
61.0% 
(n=177) 
65.5% 
(n=174) 
79.0% 
(n=176) 
28.5% 
(n=151) 
Respondents 
from the EU 
61.9% 
(n=63) 
17.2%*** 
(n=64) 
61.2%** 
(n=67) 
75.4%** 
(n=65) 
83.1% 
(n=65) 
21.2% 
(n=52) 
Respondents 
from G77/China 
50.6%** 
(n=79) 
34.6%*** 
(n=78) 
62.0%*** 
(n=79) 
55.1%*** 
(n=78) 
78.8%* 
(n=80) 
39.7%** 
(n=68) 
Expectation about Russia 
All             
respondents 
31.4% 
(n=159) 
54.3% 
(n=162) 
42.7% 
(n=164) 
52.8% 
(n=163) 
34.0% 
(n=159) 
29.4% 
(n=143) 
Respondents 
from the EU 
19.7%** 
(n=61) 
54.8% 
(n=62) 
29.5%* 
(n=61) 
57.4% 
(n=61) 
26.7% 
(n=60) 
19.6% 
(n=51) 
Respondents 
from G77/China 
42.0%*** 
(n=69) 
46.4% 
(n=69) 
54.2%* 
(n=72) 
47.9% 
(n=71) 
43.7%* 
(n=71) 
43.8%** 
(n=64) 
Expectation about the USA 
All             
respondents 
35.7% 
(n=171) 
60.8% 
(n=171) 
41.0% 
(n=173) 
29.8% 
(n=171)  
29.9% 
(n=167) 
32.4% 
(n=148)  
Respondents 
from the EU 
26.6%* 
(n=64) 
58.7% 
(n=63) 
29.2%** 
(n=65) 
17.5%** 
(n=63) 
29.0% 
(n=62) 
24.0% 
(n=50) 
Respondents 
from G77/China 
49.3%** 
(n=75) 
60.5% 
(n=76) 
47.4% 
(n=76) 
39.5%* 
(n=76) 
34.2%* 
(n=73) 
37.9% 
(n=66) 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the distribution of the expected degree of incorporation of the respective equity 
rules (with parameter values “a very high degree”, “a high degree”, “a moderate degree”, “a low degree”, and 
“no degree”, irrespective of the relative frequencies) differs between the respondents from the EU (or, 
alternatively, from G77/China) and the corresponding respondents from outside the EU (or, alternatively, from 
outside G77/China) at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance according to the appropriate chi-squared test  
 
Corresponding ranking regarding the perceived incorporation of the equity rules: 
EU:   POL  ABI f  SOV  EGA f f
G77/China:  ABI f  POL f  EGA  SOV  f
Russia:  SOV  ABI  POL  EGA f f f
USA:   SOV  POL  EGA  ABI  f f f
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Table B.2: Relative frequencies regarding the most important equity rule in the distribution 
of entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions  
Most important equity 
rule 
EGA SOV POL ABI 
Expectation about the EU 
All respondents         
(n=174) 
12.1% 22.4% 54.6% 10.9% 
Respondents from      
the EU** (n=64) 
6.3% 14.1% 67.2% 12.5% 
Respondents from 
G77/China (n=80) 
12.5% 26.3% 50.0% 11.3% 
Expectation about G77/China 
All respondents   
(n=174) 
37.9% 8.0% 23.0% 31.0% 
Respondents from     
the EU** (n=65) 
47.7% 4.6% 13.8% 33.9% 
Respondents from 
G77/China*** (n=79) 
22.8% 12.7% 36.7% 27.8% 
Expectation about Russia 
All respondents   
(n=156) 
7.7% 43.6% 22.4% 26.3% 
Respondents from     
the EU (n=57) 
7.0% 45.6% 14.0% 33.3% 
Respondents from 
G77/China*** (n=70) 
4.3% 37.1% 34.3% 24.3% 
Expectation about the USA 
All respondents   
(n=165) 
17.6% 52.7% 24.2% 5.5% 
Respondents from      
the EU (n=60) 
11.7% 65.0% 20.0% 3.3% 
Respondents from 
G77/China** (n=74) 
25.7% 39.2% 28.4% 6.8% 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the distribution of the expected most important equity rule (with parameter values 
“EGA”, “SOV”, “POL”, and “ABI”) differs between the respondents from the EU (or, alternatively, from 
G77/China) and the corresponding respondents from outside the EU (or, alternatively, from outside 
G77/China) at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance according to the appropriate chi-squared test of 
independence 
 
Corresponding ranking regarding the most important equity rule: 
EU:   POL  SOV  EGA  ABI  f f f
G77/China:  EGA  ABI f  POL  SOV  f f
Russia:  SOV  ABI  POL  EGA f f f
USA:   SOV  POL  EGA  ABI  f f f
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Table B.3: Relative frequencies that some reasons play an important role for the 
incorporation of the most important equity rule in international climate negotiations  
 Expectation 
about          
the EU  
Expectation 
about 
G77/China  
Expectation 
about          
Russia 
Expectation 
about          
the USA 
Reason: Material self interest 
All respondents 62.7%   
(n=153) 
86.1%  
(n=166) 
88.9%  
(n=162) 
93.5% 
(n=168) 
Respondents from     
the EU 
51.9%** 
(n=54) 
96.8%*** 
(n=63) 
93.5%    
(n=62) 
96.9%   
(n=64) 
Respondents from 
G77/China 
70.8%*  
(n=72) 
75.3%*** 
(n=73) 
81.7%*** 
(n=71) 
90.8%   
(n=76) 
Reason: Fairness considerations of the public 
All respondents 87.9% 
(n=157) 
58.9% 
(n=158) 
41.3% 
(n=150) 
44.4% 
(n=151) 
Respondents from     
the EU 
87.9%   
(n=58) 
44.8%*** 
(n=58) 
20.0%*** 
(n=55) 
35.1%*  
(n=57) 
Respondents from 
G77/China 
88.9%   
(n=72) 
67.1%** 
(n=73) 
54.5%*** 
(n=66) 
43.9%   
(n=66) 
Reason: Facilitation of international climate negotiations 
All respondents 83.1%  
(n=160) 
46.9% 
(n=160) 
49.3% 
(n=142) 
30.8% 
(n=159) 
Respondents from     
the EU 
80.7%   
(n=57) 
28.1%*** 
(n=57) 
32.7%*** 
(n=52) 
18.3%***  
(n=60) 
Respondents from 
G77/China 
83.3%   
(n=72) 
63.5%*** 
(n=74) 
67.7%***  
(n=62) 
32.4%   
(n=68) 
Reason: Pressure from industry 
All respondents 52.9%  
(n=153)  
45.0% 
(n=151) 
69.7% 
(n=145) 
83.9% 
(n=168) 
Respondents from     
the EU 
49.1%   
(n=61) 
61.1%*** 
(n=54) 
77.8%   
(n=54) 
85.7%   
(n=63) 
Respondents from 
G77/China 
54.5%   
(n=66) 
32.9%*** 
(n=70) 
61.9%*  
(n=63) 
80.8%   
(n=73) 
Reason: Pressure from environmental NGO’s  
All respondents 78.9%   
(n=166)  
31.3% 
(n=144) 
29.7% 
(n=138) 
47.4% 
(n=154) 
Respondents from      
the EU 
76.7%   
(n=60) 
19.2%** 
(n=52) 
13.5%*** 
(n=52) 
33.9%** 
(n=56) 
Respondents from 
G77/China 
85.7%**  
(n=77) 
43.5%*** 
(n=69) 
46.7%*** 
(n=60) 
60.6%*** 
(n=66) 
Note: * (**, ***) means that the relative frequencies that a reason plays for a country or group of country an 
important role for the incorporation of the most important equity rule in international climate negotiations 
differs between the respondents from the EU (or, alternatively, from G77/China) and the corresponding 
respondents from outside the EU (or, alternatively, from outside G77/China) at the 10% (5%, 1%) level of 
significance according to the appropriate chi-squared test  
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